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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the historical background of the current developments in Central Eastern Europe, 
in other parts of Eastern Europe and in previously member countries of the former Soviet Union. The 
author concludes that the political and economic transformation of these countries to a solid 
democracy and well-functioning market economy have not been successful for most of them yet, and 
this may have serious consequences on the European Union, too. 
The paper contrasts these trends with what we can observe in the United States now. The author turns 
to the “hard facts” next, when he discusses the different factors of human and economic development 
and the issue of migration in the Central and East European post-socialist countries and in a selected 
group of advanced countries. 
Keywords 
economic and social development, transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, populism and 
authoritarianism, human development index 
JEL Codes: C00, D60, I00, N14, O10, O19, P20 
 
1. Introduction 
When political and economic transformation started in the early 1990s in the formerly socialist 
European countries and in the former Soviet Union, the previously so-called “Soviet bloc” countries 
could be re-grouped into five regional groups: (1) the Central East European (CEE) countries: Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia that have been to the East of Germany 
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and Austria, but West from Russia and Ukraine; (2) the East European member states of the former 
Soviet Union: Belarus, Russia and Ukraine; (3) the Balkan countries: Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova, 
the member countries of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia 
FYR and Montenegro); (4) the Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and (5) the Asian 
member states of the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) and Mongolia. These groups are based, first of all, on 
their different levels of economic and social development. While, for instance, the CEE and the Baltic 
countries have belonged to the larger international group of medium-developed countries for a fairly 
long time, the Balkan countries and the middle-Asian countries of the former Soviet Union have been 
lagging behind in both respects. In addition, the CEE and the Baltic countries had joined and have been 
members of the European Union since 2004. 
I shall focus on the CEE countries and on Russia in this paper, and I shall argue that most of them are 
embracing increasingly authoritarian and extremist models of governance. I could have added some of 
the Balkan countries and the Middle-Asian countries of the former Soviet Union to the list of populist 
and authoritarian regimes, but those countries have only an indirect influence and impact on the 
functioning of the European Union, therefore I decided not to discuss their case more deeply in this 
study. However, when I analyze the data on formerly socialist countries, I shall include the 
Middle-Asian countries in the group of post-Soviet nations, too. 
The previously mentioned developments pose a serious threat to Europe as a whole. Current trends 
may—and I shall argue below that they actually will—trigger a deep economic and political crisis 
within Europe and the European Union (the EU, Europe’s largest political and economic organization) 
which could ultimately result in the disintegration of the EU. 
I must add that more and more influential political groups in several West European countries appear to 
follow a similar path as the CEE countries and the Russian Federation. (The latest political shock 
occurred in Italy through its national elections. France is also witnessing an expanding right-wing 
extremism). However, the most immediate threat for Europe and for the EU comes from Central 
Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, president Trump’s and his government’s policy decisions in the US tend 
to resonate with developments in CEE and in Russia, too, potentially reinforcing renascent nationalism, 
racism and xenophobia in the region. As a consequence, the US may also be affected by these adverse 
developments (Note 1). 
At a first glance, finding significant similarities between the United States and several transition 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe may sound far-fetched or even preposterous. However, 
recently unfolding events show a strong convergence between these distant parts of our world. The 
Trump administration’s foreign trade policy—for instance, starting a “tariff war” with China and with 
other countries and regional organizations like the EU, reshaping NAFTA, triggering conflicts with the 
EU, escalating the Syrian crisis, insisting to build a wall on the US-Mexican border—its stance 
regarding less developed countries and migration issues, and back home its attempts to reshape the US 
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constitution and the legal system of the United States, its attacks on free media and speech are very 
similar to what we can observe in Hungary and in other CEE countries, and on the agenda of extreme 
right political groups in Western and Southern Europe. 
Initially, the European crisis has been triggered by the collapse of the real estate market in the United 
States and the ensuing shocks at US stock exchanges in 2006-2007, but its roots reach much deeper 
than the effects of the financial turmoil in the United States. Will developments in Europe and the US 
converge and lead them into the same dark pit? Will the failure of several CEE countries to create a 
stable and solid political democracy and a sound market economy, and the resurgence of nationalist and 
racist groups in these countries and in a number of West and South European countries, too, ultimately 
result in the disintegration of the EU? As for the United States, will the world’s leading political 
democracy resort to segregation, scapegoating certain ethnic groups, closing its borders and embracing 
authoritarianism? 
I start my paper with a brief literature review and with description of the methodology I use, especially 
when I present and analyze international data in Section 1. I describe the historical background of the 
current developments in CEE countries, and I contrast these trends with what we can observe in the 
United States in Section 2. I discuss the “hard facts” about economic and human development in the 
second part of my paper when I present my analysis on the different factors of human and economic 
development and the issue of migration in the CEE countries and in other East European post-socialist 
countries and in a selected group of advanced countries in Section 3. I shall separately discuss here the 
case of the extremist-populist post-socialist countries. I sum up the main findings under Conclusions in 
Section 4. 
 
2. Literature Review and Methodology 
Section 2 is a verbal analysis of recent and previous—pre-World War II and socialist—development in 
formerly socialist countries. Here I relied on János Kornai’s and Iván T. Berend’s studies (Note 2), and 
on my own information as an active participant of the transformation period. Regarding populism in 
Europe and in the US, I could largely benefit from the writings of Madeleine Albright, Roger Cohen, 
William Galston, Paul Krugman, Dani Rodrik and Andrew Wilson (Note 3). 
I also used international data to support my arguments. Most of the data I worked with were coming 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2018 database. I used these data to calculate my 
modified composite Human Development Index (HDI), too. The original HDI indices are calculated 
and published regularly by the United Nations Organization (UNO). In addition, I included some 
indicators on the level of education in different countries from OECD PISA Report 2016. Since—as I 
discuss in this paper—populism, authoritarianism and politically high-level corruption go hand-in-hand 
in most of the CEE countries, I also collected data from Transparency International’s database on 
corruption. I present those data in the Appendix.  
I mostly included the raw data from the above databases and I calculated the averages for the country 
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groups in my analysis. Finally, I conducted a simple linear regression analysis on the relationship 
between my composite HDI indicator and its components by countries and country groups to see which 
factors have the largest impact on these countries’ social, human and economic development. 
 
3. Extremism and De-Globalization in Central Eastern Europe—Facts and Historical 
Background 
The deepening European crisis started with the US’s real estate, then financial crisis and with Greece’s 
financial collapse. Then it quickly accelerated with the explosion of the Syrian refugee crisis 
accompanied by an increasing inflow of Muslim immigrants (Note 4). Yet, what may lead to the 
destabilization of the European Union is not the financial shock or the successive waves of immigrants, 
but the widening and deepening rift between West European and Central and East European values and 
attitudes toward political democracy, human rights and individual liberty. 
The international financial crisis enfeebled the “immune system” of European countries and rendered 
them vulnerable to more acute “auto-immune” diseases, manifested in the EU’s inability to solve the 
Greek government debt crisis or the current immigration crisis. However, the decisive factors of a 
deep-seated malaise lie much deeper: they are related to an increasing confusion about the fundamental 
values of political democracy and a sound economic system, especially in a growing number of CEE 
and other East European countries. 
The US has been similarly and deeply affected by the worldwide financial and economic crisis and 
migration. The latter issue has become the centerpiece of president Trump’s agenda as it has the 
authoritarian right-wing political parties and groups in Great Britain, France and Italy, and even in 
Scandinavian and other North European countries, not to mention the extremist Central and East 
European nations. However, the US had left most of the effects of the recent economic crisis behind 
already in 2011-2012, while the EU member states continue to struggle with the issues of economic 
recovery and first of all, with high unemployment rates that are close to 10% in several EU member 
countries. 
 
Table 1. Economic Growth and Unemployment in the EU, in the U.S.A. and in Populist East 
European Countries between 2007 and 2016 
  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Euro area GDP annual 
growth (%) 
3.02 0.43 -4.52 2.09 1.55 -0.91 -0.26 1.23 2.00 1.75 2.73 
European Union 3.09 0.46 -4.38 2.15 1.67 -0.47 0.22 1.67 2.20 1.87 2.44 
EU Advanced Countries 4.10 0.23 -3.72 2.15 2.20 0.52 1.27 2.49 3.77 2.61 2.71 
EU Southern Countries 3.48 0.77 -3.80 1.32 0.01 -2.56 -0.87 1.15 2.33 2.01 3.31 
Advanced Countries 2.91 0.96 -2.62 3.45 2.27 1.95 2.03 2.38 2.06 1.92 2.35 
U.S.A. 1.78 -0.29 -2.78 4.08 3.66 0.49 0.49 1.93 1.74 1.94 2.27 
Russian Federation 8.5 5.2 -7.8 4.50 4.26 3.52 1.28 0.73 -2.83 1.11 1.55 
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Populist CEE Countries 
Mean 6.25 3.46 -4.87 2.40 2.59 0.37 0.79 2.14 2.36 2.17 3.59 
STD 1.88 1.37 1.98 1.60 1.38 1.49 1.12 1.30 1.65 1.12 1.02 
Euro area GDP per 
capita annual 
growth (%) 
2.49 -0.06 -4.83 1.85 1.77 -1.13 -0.60 0.90 1.67 1.34 2.11 
European Union 2.69 0.08 -4.67 1.93 1.75 -0.69 -0.07 1.36 1.89 1.52 2.19 
EU Advanced Countries 3.14 -0.64 -4.43 1.46 1.57 -0.20 0.50 1.60 2.76 1.58 1.64 
EU Southern Countries 2.42 -0.30 -4.71 0.48 -0.73 -2.98 -1.06 1.15 2.36 1.74 3.04 
Advanced Countries 2.35 0.17 -3.33 0.85 1.46 0.96 1.80 2.09 0.74 0.85 2.45 
U.S.A. 0.82 -1.23 -3.62 1.68 0.85 1.46 0.97 1.61 1.85 0.74 2.27 
Russian Federation 8.7 5.3 -7.8 4.5 4.2 3.3 1.1 -1.1 -3.0 2.4 1.55 
Populist CEE Countries 
Mean 6.22 3.35 -4.95 2.46 3.09 0.42 0.83 1.94 2.47 2.30 3.43 
STD 1.88 1.38 1.97 1.57 1.11 1.42 1.11 1.44 1.66 1.20 1.01 
Euro area Unemploym
ent, % of 
total labor 
force, ILO 
estimate 
7.44 7.50 9.55 10.11 10.18 11.35 11.99 11.59 10.82 10.05 9.05 
European Union 7.17 7.00 8.92 9.56 9.64 10.45 10.85 10.19 9.36 8.58 7.62 
EU Advanced Countries 5.07 5.02 6.72 7.04 6.81 6.89 6.97 6.73 6.51 6.09 5.53 
EU Southern Countries 7.24 7.77 10.43 11.44 12.83 15.89 17.75 17.24 16.08 14.95 13.52 
Advanced Countries 5.15 5.20 6.74 6.64 6.19 5.92 5.72 5.34 5.02 4.77 4.48 
U.S.A. 4.62 5.78 9.25 9.63 8.95 8.07 7.38 6.17 5.28 4.87 4.35 
Russian Federation 6.0 6.2 8.3 7.3 6.5 5.5 5.5 5.2 5.6 5.3 5.20 
Populist CEE Countries 
Mean 8.23 7.26 9.06 10.24 10.19 10.57 10.73 9.74 8.78 7.43 6.08 
STD 1.53 1.34 1.36 1.65 1.78 2.00 2.10 2.15 2.08 1.89 1.67 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2018. 
Legend: The European Union currently consists of 27 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden. 
The Euro Area has 19 countries within the EU-member countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. The United Kingdom—that was the 28th country 
in the EU—will leave the European Union in March, 2019. 
Populist CEE Countries: Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation and Slovak 
Republic. STD = Standard deviation. 
 
Data in Table 1 draws a fairly bright picture of the populist CEE countries: the annual rate of growth of 
their GDP and GDP per capita slightly exceeded the same indicators of the EU’s or the Euro Area’s 
average rates as well as those of the US until 2017. The populist countries’ unemployment rate was 
already below the EU’s average rate of unemployment, although it exceeded the same measure of the 
US. However, the picture is not gloomy only at the first sight. As several analysts have already shown, 
economic growth in the populist CEE countries has been fueled only by the inflow of EU support funds 
(Note 5). The unemployment rate decreased in these countries mostly because of massive emigration of 
the active population and by the “public work” programs that forced the unemployed population to start 
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working on public projects for a lower pay than the minimum wage in these countries (Note 6). 
However, it was reported by several international agencies—like EuroStat, the IMF, etc.—that the 
populist countries’ economic performance started deteriorating recently. Thus, what Viktor Orbán 
asserts—that Hungary and other CEE populist countries will take over the leading economic position in 
the EU within a few years—is just merely a bad joke and a lie. The average value of the EU advanced 
countries’ GDP per capita calculated in constant 2010 US PPP dollars was 42,269 in 2017, while the 
same indicator of the CEE populist countries stood at the level of 27,365 in that year. So even in case, 
the CEE populist countries could hold their GDP per capita growth rate at that level—at 3,43% per 
annum—and the EU advanced countries couldn’t grow faster than in 2017—their average growth rate 
was 2.71%—it would take about 50 years for the CEE populists to catch up with the advanced 
countries. 
As can also be derived from the data in Table 1, the current proliferation of extremism, nationalism and 
racism in the US—supported by president Trump and his close allies—have nothing to do directly with 
past economic or political problems, nor in the EU member countries. However, the neglect and 
abandonment of large groups of the US or those of the European population by the previous 
governments who had been adversely affected by the recent financial and economic crisis created a 
fertile soil for extremist and violent policies and social groups in the US and in Europe, too. 
In January 1992, I published an Op-Ed piece in the New York Times titled “Why Eastern Europe Is 
Going Nowhere?” Now I must admit I was wrong. Several East European countries are unfortunately 
heading toward a specific direction: toward dictatorial, racist and corrupt politico-economic systems 
the prefiguration of which can be partly found in pro-Fascist regimes of the 1930s and 1940s, and in 
part in the “actually existing socialism” between 1950s and the late 1980s. There is, of course, diversity 
among these East European countries with regard to the level of authoritarianism, corruption and the 
pull of history upon current developments. For instance, a liberal president, Zuzana Caputova was 
elected in Slovakia this year. However, it has not a large impact on the CEE countries’ development yet. 
As the recent European Parliamentary election results show the extremist parties gained strength in 
several EU-member countries. The three outstanding examples in this regard are Hungary, Poland and 
the Russian Republic. But in most cases, the trajectories of the above-mentioned factors tend to merge. 
We cannot assert the same about the US yet, but recent and current developments during and after the 
last presidential election point in a similar direction. For instance, president Trump’s and his supporters’ 
attempt to amend the US Constitution at several points to make the country “safer” and to secure their 
dominance strongly reminds us of what Vladimir Putin, the Russian president had done in the early 
2000s, president Kaczynski and his followers pushed through in Poland, and the Hungarian prime 
minister Viktor Orbán and his political cohort did to the Hungarian Constitution in and after 2012. The 
recent events in Charlottesville, VA, president Trump’s comments on the horrible attacks on non-white 
US citizens and the widely publicized views of some of his senior staff members have an uncanny 
similarity to events in Hungary and in some other CEE countries—unfortunately, also in some West 
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European countries—regarding the governments’ policies and declarations about Syrian refugees, the 
Jews and “foreigners” in general. 
However, I must emphasize a very important difference between the US and CEE countries: while the 
system of checks and balances are still in place in the United States—although the current president 
and his aids try to undermine this crucial guarantee upholding a democratic and just political system in 
the US—as yet no such safeguards can be found in several CEE countries. However, should the current 
trends gather force in the US, they will considerably weaken the system of checks and balances, as well 
as the US’s leading position in the global economy. While the United States has been a “model” for 
democracy, individual freedom and liberty for most people around the world, today its leading role is 
fading. 
How could the promising start of the Central and East European political and economic transition of 
the early 1990s from “actually existing socialism” morph into a dismal East European “actually 
existing capitalism”? Obviously, there are several reasons for these adverse developments. I shall 
discuss only a few of them. Firstly, the transition has essentially been an intellectual exercise executed 
by the Central and East European political and business elites—supported by Western advisors—and 
not an organic process that could have prepared the people of Central and Eastern Europe to face the 
challenges and hardship of the systemic change. 
Secondly, the successive, democratically elected Central and East European governments focused on 
the short-term political and economic gains of transition, and several of them fell back on authoritarian 
and paternalistic economic policies and regulatory regimes, while severely neglecting education, health 
care and other social services. Consequently, the majority of Central and East European economies 
failed to develop sufficient resistance to the subsequent economic shocks. Concurrently, the most 
vulnerable segments of Central and East European societies were left without a social safety net that 
could have softened the shocks of the transition when hundreds of thousands of people had lost their 
job and fell into deep poverty without any social help. 
Thirdly, the elites and the entire population avoided to face up to and openly discuss these countries’ 
tragic historical legacy suffused with pro-fascist and communist values, ideologies and practices. What 
had happened in Germany after World War II in the 1960s—notably, German politicians and social 
scientists, writers and the media, schoolteachers and family members sought to understand the reasons 
for the emergence of the Nazi regime and its legacy; then again, in the early 1990s in a reunited 
Germany the German Parliament decided to open the archives of STASI, the East German secret police, 
exposing all the dirty secrets of the country's recent past—setting an example that should have been 
followed by all the Central and East European countries, most of which had been close allies of Nazi 
Germany and later of the Soviet Union under Stalin and his successors. However, as the communist 
regimes between the 1950s and 1980s glossed over these countries’ conduct under Nazi rule, so did the 
post-communist political regimes ignore the lessons of the pre-war and the socialist epoch. Both 
regimes used classified information for blackmail to turn those serving the previous regime into their 
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own loyal minions. In addition, the conservative, right-wing political parties adopted increasingly 
nationalist and racist ideologies and practices. Right-wing extremism reached back to the Nazi epoch, 
as well. These political practices merged into the current populism, extremism and authoritarianism in 
many of the Central and East European countries. 
 
4. Economic and Social Development in the Post-Socialist Countries 
In the following section I shall analyze and discuss the data on post-socialist countries in the period of 
1990 up to 2017. Data used in this section is derived from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, 2018. I shall focus on the European post-socialist countries, but I included data on some 
Euro-Asian, Latin American and Asian countries in the data base, as well. The whole group of the 
post-socialist countries I worked with consists of the following nations: 
Balkan Countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia, FYR, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Romania, Serbia. 
Baltic Countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. 
Post-Soviet Countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Mongolia. 
Central East European Countries: Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia. 
Asian Socialist Countries: China, Korea Dem. People’s Republic, Lao PDR, Vietnam. 
Latin American Post-Socialist Countries: Cuba, Nicaragua. 
I pay special attention to those European post-socialist countries that have drifted toward more and 
more extremist and populist social and economic policies. The group of Central and East European 
populist countries consists of: Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation 
and the Slovak Republic. 
I compare and contrast the economic and social development of post-socialist countries with a group of 
advanced countries that includes: Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America, with the “core” countries of the EU—labelled as 
“Advanced EU Countries” (Note 7) and with the South European EU member countries (Note 8). The 
following data tables and analysis refer to these country groups. 
The political and economic transformation started with the populations’ and politicians’ high hope 
about a bright future in all East European countries. They all assumed that these countries will easily 
jump the band-wagon of the advanced countries’ development path. Then the first shock came in the 
early 1990s when the previously existing foreign trade network—the COMECON—of the Central and 
East European countries collapsed and millions of people lost their job overnight. 
The transition process of the formerly socialist countries—including the creation of institutions of a 
multi-party political democracy, of a legal system that is based on individual freedom and liberty, of a 
market economy based on private ownership and secured property rights, and the opening up to the 
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whole world in foreign trade and in culture—progressed in up-and-down cycles in all post-socialist 
countries. However, after 28 years of its beginning we can clearly state that the transition in most of 
these countries failed. 
Although the rate of economic growth (annual GDP growth) of the post-socialist nations exceeded the 
growth rate of the advanced countries to some extent, especially between 2004 and 2017—which is a 
small wonder because the post-socialist countries had started transition from a very low level of 
economic development—the overall picture of economic development still has not become very bright. 
I already mentioned above, that the main source of economic growth—especially in those CEE 
countries that joined the EU in 2003-2004 or later—has recently been the inflow of EU support funds 
rather than these countries’ internal development based on expanding investments—especially in 
high-tech industries—, savings and foreign trade. While the average gross fixed capital formation 
relative to the countries’ GDP was already 23.4% in the advanced countries between 2010 and 2017, it 
reached only 21.1% in the post-socialist populist countries, and 21.8% in the whole group of 
post-socialist countries during the same period (Note 9). Foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows 
amounted to 2.34% and net outflows to 2.27% of the advanced countries’ total GDP, while it stood at to 
5.3% and 1.4%, respectively in the whole group of post-socialist countries—driven mostly by China’s 
and other Asian countries’ FDI activities (Note 10)—and they were only 1.52 and 0.76%, respectively 
in the populist CEE countries in 2010-2017. These low levels of FDI also signaled the foreign investors’ 
decreasing confidence in populist countries. Finally, the average gross savings relative to the advanced 
countries’ gross national income (GNI) amounted to 23.2% in 2010–17, while they were 22.7% in the 
populist countries, and 22.2% on average in all of the post-socialist countries (Note 11). 
However, the most important and ultimate issue in a country’s economic development is not its growth 
rate or the rate of accumulation but people’s well-being in that country. The United Nations’ Human 
Development Index (HDI) intends to measure the countries’ economic and social development in a 
complex way by incorporating the level of education, healthcare and economic welfare—based on the 
countries’ GDP per capita, GNP per capita or GNI per capita in one index measure (Note 12). The UN 
has recently published more refined HDI data that are adjusted by the inequality in the population’s 
access to education, healthcare and income in the countries, and it intends to fine tune the HDI index 
even further (Note 13). 
I created a more complex HDI index by incorporating additional factors in the sub-indices. I labelled 
the first sub-index the Human Capital Index (HCap) (Note 14) that is the average of the following 
indicators: 
 At least secondary level education of the total population (%); 
 Government expenditure on education/GDP (%); 
 Literacy rate of the population (25+ years old) (%); and 
 Research & Development Expenditure/GDP (%). 
The second factor is the Healthcare Index (Health) that consists of: 
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 Public expenditure on healthcare/GDP (%); 
 Public expenditure on healthcare/Total government expenditure (%); 
 Total expenditure on healthcare/GDP; 
 Life expectancy at birth; 
 (Mortality rate, female + Mortality rate, male + Mortality rate, infant)/3. 
The third indicator reflects a country’s attention and effort to assist the poorer part of its population, the 
magnitude of income inequality and the size of the unemployed population relative to the active 
population. It is labelled Welfare, which is calculated as given below: 
Welfare = (GINI Index + Income share of the highest 10% + Income share of the lowest 10%+ 
Unemployment rate)/4. 
Finally, economic development is represented in this composite HDI as the logarithm of the Net 
Adjusted National Income per Capita (LANNIpC) measured in constant 2010 US$, multiplied by (1 - 
GINI Index) and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The reason for adjusting the net adjusted 
national income per capita by the measure of income inequality and by the level of corruption is that in 
countries where income inequality is large, domestic demand will be limited that constraints the 
country’s economic growth (Note 15). And I already mentioned before, corruption is also hurting 
economic and social development, because the country’s monetary assets are not used for the adequate 
purposes. 
I also applied the UNO’s “maximum - minimum” measure, but I calculated it for indicators where a 
lower value is preferable to a higher one as follows: 
 valueMinimum valueMaximum
 valueactual scountry' the valueMaximum

 . I present the results in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2. Composite Human Development Indices for the Country Groups 
GINI+CPI Adjusted 
Avg 
9094 
Avg 
9599 
Avg 
0004 
Avg 
0509 
Avg 
1016 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
HDI Balkan Co.s 44.06 43.62 40.30 41.76 44.98 45.43 45.92 46.20 45.50 44.24 44.84 42.72 
HDI Baltic Co.s 56.82 56.24 53.93 54.71 57.38 56.07 57.17 58.82 58.48 57.36 57.44 56.34 
HDI Post-Soviet Co.s 41.68 40.81 39.61 42.63 44.65 45.19 45.05 45.84 46.09 44.24 44.59 41.51 
HDI CEE Co.s 59.64 59.09 56.46 56.68 59.53 60.11 59.67 60.98 60.05 58.83 59.47 57.55 
HDI Asian Co.s 37.09 36.62 34.36 35.55 37.33 38.11 36.21 38.48 39.48 37.27 36.61 35.12 
HDI LA Co.s 40.18 39.49 39.29 41.52 42.76 43.64 42.04 42.67 43.53 43.14 42.88 41.41 
HDI Post-socialist Co.s 46.58 45.98 43.99 45.48 47.77 48.09 47.68 48.83 48.85 47.51 47.64 45.78 
HDI CEE Populist Co.s 58.60 57.04 53.45 53.29 56.71 57.19 56.84 58.17 57.53 56.06 56.71 54.45 
HDI Advanced Co.s 68.36 69.71 66.92 66.24 69.21 70.45 70.02 71.17 70.44 67.68 67.61 67.11 
HDI Euro Area 76.94 79.43 77.97 77.30 75.77 78.34 77.09 77.27 76.92 73.84 72.74 74.22 
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HDI EU 71.35 71.94 71.14 69.69 65.27 69.93 68.32 65.50 64.90 62.24 61.92 64.06 
HDI EU Advanced Co.s 83.33 87.16 84.17 82.66 81.16 83.03 82.07 82.52 82.21 79.52 78.48 80.28 
HDI EU Southern Co.s 62.03 65.06 64.96 63.44 58.74 63.77 62.01 59.07 57.91 55.63 55.63 57.14 
HDI U.S.A. 67.51 69.46 70.72 67.29 64.85 64.67 64.78 66.12 66.11 64.29 61.04 62.22 
Legend: Avg = average for the given period; Co.s = Countries. 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the composite HDI indices of the post-socialist countries and the CEE 
populist countries are below the advanced countries’ and the EU’s leading countries’ relevant indicator 
which is not a surprise. However, while the HDI of some groups of the post-socialist countries started 
way below the same index of the currently populist CEE post-socialist countries, the gap between the 
post-socialist groups’ and the CEE populists’ HDI considerably decreased, mostly after 2010. This is 
especially relevant for the Baltic countries’ HDI, which countries surpassed the CEE populist countries’ 
HDI in the early 2000s. It happened despite the fact that the populist Central East European countries 
had started the transition in a much better economic and social shape than the other post-socialist 
nations. While the average of GDP per capita in constant 2010 US$ amounted to 6,853 in the whole 
group of post-socialist countries, it reached 13,977 in the group of CEE populist countries during the 
transformation period’s first phase (between 1990 and 1994). The structure of employment in the 
post-socialist countries matched the employment structure of the less or least developed countries on 
Earth in that period: employment in agriculture accounted for 28.8%, in industry 29.2% while in the 
service sector only for 42%. In the currently populist Central and East European countries, the same 
measures stood at 16.4%, 36.5% and 47.1%, respectively. Education and healthcare were much more 
developed in the latter than in the former group of countries. Central East European populist countries 
had attracted more foreign direct investments relative to their GDP than the entire group of 
post-socialist countries, too (2.3% and 1.6%, respectively). Despite these positive endowments, CEE 
populist countries could not reduce the gap between themselves and the advanced European countries 
or other advanced countries. 
It is also important and interesting to observe what happened in the United States of America since the 
last decade of the 20th century. As can be seen in Table 2 above, the US started the 1990s at a fairly high 
composite HDI. The US’s indicators were close to the EU’s data between 1990 and 2009, although it 
was below the same indicators of the EU advanced countries. The main reason for this was the much 
higher inequality in the US than in EU-member countries. In addition, the GINI and CPI-adjusted Net 
National Income per Capita dragged the US’s indicators down, too. The gap started widening further, 
and the US has been lagging behind the EU—especially behind the EU Advanced Countries—since 
2010. What happened after Donald Trump became the president of the United States is even more 
shocking (See Table 3 below!). 
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Table 3. HDI in the US and in the European Union in 2017 
 U.S.A. 2017 Euro Area 2017 EU 2017 EU Adv. Co.s 2017 
Hcap 64.73 53.46 52.67 62.61 
Healthcare 82.00 91.26 87.77 91.35 
Welfare 59.60 70.27 35.69 70.27 
LANNIpC 42.83 87.14 82.18 100.00 
HDI 62.29 75.53 64.33 81.06 
Legend: EU Adv. Co.s = EU Advanced Countries 
 
The US was far behind the Euro Area and the EU Advanced countries in Healthcare, Welfare and first of 
all, in the Adjusted Net National Income per Capita in 2017. That resulted in an increasing gap between 
the more developed part of Europe and the US. When it comes to the whole European Union, the distance 
between the US and the EU is minuscule, first of all because of the admitted CEE countries and some of 
the South European countries. 
I also calculated the difference between the US’s and the advanced part of the EU’s HDI between 1990 
and 2017 (See Table 4 below!). 
 
Table 4. The Difference between the US’s and the EU Regions’ HDI between 1990 and 2017 
 
Avg 
9094 
Avg 
9599 
Avg 
0004 
Avg 
0509 
Avg 
1016 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Euro A – US 9.43 9.97 7.25 10.01 10.92 13.67 12.31 11.15 10.81 9.55 11.7 12 13.24 
EU – US 3.84 2.48 0.42 2.4 0.42 5.26 3.54 -0.62 -1.21 -2.05 0.88 1.84 2.04 
EU Adv – US 15.82 17.7 13.45 15.37 16.31 18.36 17.29 16.4 16.1 15.23 17.44 18.06 18.77 
Legend: Euro A = Euro Area; EU Adv = Advanced EU member countries; Avg = Average. 
 
As data in Table 4 attest, the gap between the US’s HDI and different parts of the EU has been fluctuating 
since 1990, but it started widening recently. This is partly due to the consequences of increasing income 
inequality in the US after the recent financial and economic crisis, but is also connected to president 
Trump’s populist foreign trade and industrial policy (Note 16). 
Now we ask the really important question: which factors have driven the change of the countries’ HDI 
in different groups of countries? To answer this question, I used a simple linear regression analysis to 
relate the HDI to its components. The regression function I applied was as follows: 
tt
ANNIpCG
tt
Welfare
tt
Health
tt
HCap
ttt
HDI  
,4,3,2,1,0
, 
where the definitions of the explanatory variables are given above, except ANNIpCGt, which stands for 
the annual growth of the adjusted net national income per capita in the different country groups in 
period t. I included this variable in the analysis to test the widespread assumption that a country’s 
human (economic and social) development is mostly driven by its economic growth. 
After I derived the parameters of the explanatory (independent) variables from the regression function, 
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I normalized their parameters (the 
ti, values) to unity. By doing so, I ultimately received the 
contribution of each factor to the composite HDI’s changes in percentages. I present the results by 
country groups in Tables 5.a-5.e below. I included the HDI values in these tables, too, in order to 
evaluate the impact and the direction of change in the explanatory factors on HDI. 
Table 5.a presents the results for the whole group of post-socialist countries, including the East 
European, the Middle Asian, the Asian and the Latin-American countries, too. This is a fairly 
heterogeneous set of countries regarding their level of economic development and that of their social 
and legal institutions. Consequently, the less-developed post-Soviet and Balkan countries plus China 
dominate the results of the whole group. 
 
Table 5.a. The Impact of the Explanatory Factors on the Composite Human Development Index 
(HDI) in the Post-Socialist Countries 
Post-Socialist Countries HCap Health Welfare ANNIpCG HDI Post-Socialist Countries 
1990-1994 Average 28.5*** 34.6** 37.5** -0.6* 46.58 
1995-1999 Average 29.7*** 34.4** 34.1** 1.9* 45.98 
2000-2004 Average 30.4*** 37.5** 30.4** 1.8 43.99 
2005-2009 Average 33.0*** 36.3** 32.2** -1.4 45.48 
2010-2016 Average 32.4*** 36.0** 36.0** -4.4* 47.77 
2010 24.9*** 39.9** 39.9** -4.8 48.09 
2011 25.5*** 36.3** 29.8** 8.4* 47.68 
2012 28.3*** 37.3** 36.0** -1.5 48.83 
2013 31.3*** 35.6** 33.7** -0.6 48.85 
2014 29.3*** 37.3** 37.0** -3.6* 47.51 
2015 24.0* 41.7** 39.7** -5.3* 47.64 
2016 21.1** 39.8** 37.4** 1.8* 45.78 
Legend: *** = significant at 0.01 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; * = significant at 0.10 level; 
ANNIpCG = Adjusted Net National Income per Capita Annual Growth Rate.  
 
As can be seen in Table 5.a, HDI improved in the entire group of post-socialist countries between 1990 
and 2012, but it started fluctuating after that year. The most powerful factor that initially drove the 
growth of HDI was the considerable improvement of the healthcare indicators, especially the rapidly 
decreasing mortality rate in the less-developed post-socialist countries. The improving welfare 
indicators had a very similar impact on the group’s average HDI. Interestingly, education had a much 
weaker impact on human development than the previous two components. Finally, the impact of 
economic growth did not have a considerable effect on the group’s HDI and it frequently changed even 
in the opposite direction than the post-socialist countries’ human development index. 
Table 5.b presents the results of the populist CEE countries. This is a fairly homogenous group 
regarding their level of economic and social development. 
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Table 5.b. The Impact of the Explanatory Factors on the Composite Human Development Index 
(HDI) in the Populist East European Post-Socialist Countries 
Populist CEE Countries HCap Health Welfare ANNIpCG HDI Populist CEE Countries 
1990-1994 Average 41.7* 29.3** 21.7 7.3 58.60 
1995-1999 Average 42.3*** 32.1*** 23.5 2.1** 57.04 
2000-2004 Average 41.8*** 34.0*** 23.1** 1.1 53.45 
2005-2009 Average 42.9*** 34.3** 24.1** -1.4 53.29 
2010-2016 Average 39.5** 33.8** 28.4** -1.7 56.71 
2010 39.0* 27.2* 25.6 8.3 57.19 
2011 47.0** 33.8* 19.9 -0.7 56.84 
2012 46.7** 28.7* 22.8 1.8 58.17 
2013 45.4** 32.3** 30.7** -8.3* 57.53 
2014 38.3** 34.2** 29.3** -1.8 56.06 
2015 42.8** 31.1** 25.5** 0.6 56.71 
2016 35.2** 32.3*** 30.8* 1.7 54.45 
Legend: *** = significant at 0.01 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; * = significant at 0.10 level; 
ANNIpCG = Adjusted Net National Income per Capita Annual Growth Rate. 
 
Human development in the CEE populist countries had some similarities to, but also some differences 
with the whole group of the post-socialist countries at the beginning of the transition period: human 
capital formation dominated the factors of HDI, but healthcare rather than welfare—as it happened in 
the entire post-socialist group—came next. However, from 1995 on, healthcare has driven HDI to a 
decrease in this group, and healthcare actually drifted toward a full collapse in some populist countries, 
first of all, in Hungary (Note 17). As the political and economic transformation progressed in these 
countries, human capital took over the leading role in affecting changes of the composite HDI. In the 
early years of transition human capital formation had a positive impact on HDI. This could be 
attributed to the fact that these CEE countries attracted a large number of foreign universities, educators 
and students from the advanced countries. In addition, global companies offshored some of their R&D 
activities to these countries, too. However, as OECD’s latest PISA Report attests (Note 18), the quality 
of education considerably deteriorated in most populist countries during recent years, and HDI moved 
along as can be seen in the previous table. 
We can observe a more transparent and straightforward relationship between the change of per capita 
national income and HDI in this group: when the change of per capita national income had a negative 
effect on HDI, it could not be compensated or rebalanced by the other factors of HDI. This was 
especially true for the initial period of the transition and for 2012-2016. 
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Table 5.c. The Impact of the Explanatory Factors of the Composite Human Development Index 
(HDI) in the Advanced Countries 
 
HCap Health Welfare ANNIpCG HDI Advanced Countries 
1990-1994 Average 13.8** 69.8*** 17.6** -1.2 68.36 
1995-1999 Average 14.4* 66.1*** 20.1* -0.6 69.71 
2000-2004 Average 15.1* 59.2** 18.9** 6.8 66.92 
2005-2009 Average 21.0** 51.9*** 26.9** 0.1 66.24 
2010-2016 Average 23.8*** 47.6*** 38.2*** -9.6* 69.21 
2010 17.6** 50.7*** 41.6*** -9.9* 70.45 
2011 22.6* 44.9*** 29.0** 3.5 70.02 
2012 23.5* 45.9** 28.9* 1.8 71.17 
2013 22.4* 49.1*** 39.5** -11.0 70.44 
2014 28.9** 41.8*** 38.0*** -8.8* 67.68 
2015 17.6* 48.7** 40.0** -6.3 67.61 
2016 17.6*** 36.3*** 48.4*** -2.0*** 67.11 
Legend: *** = significant at 0.01 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; * = significant at 0.10 level; 
ANNIpCG = Adjusted Net National Income per Capita Annual Growth Rate. 
 
Data in Table 5.c. show that it has been healthcare and welfare—the latter one especially during and 
after the recent worldwide financial and economic crisis—that had the largest impact on the advanced 
countries’ human development. Human capital did not have such a strong effect as the other two factors. 
This is the direct consequence of the fact that education, literacy and R&D have already been at a high 
level in these countries for a long time, without a considerable change. Economic growth played a 
fluctuating role in human development, but it clearly contributed to the decrease of HDI between 2011 
and 2016. 
 
Table 5.d. The Impact of the Explanatory Factors of the Composite Human Development Index 
(HDI) in the Advanced EU Member Countries 
 HCap Health Welfare ANNIpCG HDI EU Advanced Countries 
1990-1994 Average 32.4** 36.5** 35.6** -4.6 83.33 
1995-1999 Average 85.4*** 16.5 26.7 -28.6 87.16 
2000-2004 Average 68.8*** 7.2 13.4 10.6 84.17 
2005-2009 Average 69.8** 0.1 25.4 4.7 82.66 
2010-2016 Average 87.1** 21.2 21.8 -30.1 81.16 
2010 47.7* 15.0 26.7 10.7 83.03 
2011 50.5* -3.0 27.8 24.7 82.07 
2012 53.8* 21.7 28.2 -3.7 82.52 
2013 155.8*** 4.9 7.1 -67.8 82.21 
2014 134.9** 15.4 12.2 -62.5 79.52 
2015 186.2** 5.0 -5.5 -85.8 78.48 
2016 116.5*** 20.7 14.7 -51.9 80.28 
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Legend: *** = significant at 0.01 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; * = significant at 0.10 level; 
ANNIpCG = Adjusted Net National Income per Capita Annual Growth Rate. 
 
Interestingly, in the European advanced countries it has been human capital formation that had the 
largest impact on HDI as can be seen in Table 5.d. The second important factor has been the growth 
rate of per capita net national income that reflect the fact that these countries have been struggling with 
the problems of the EU’s operation and could much hardly adjust to the new conditions during and 
after the recent financial and economic crisis. 
 
Table 5.e. The Impact of the Explanatory Factors of the Composite Human Development Index 
(HDI) in the Southern EU Member Countries 
 
HCap Health Welfare ANNIpCG HDI EU Southern Countries 
1990-1994 Average -16.0 -48.0 5.0** -41.0** 62.03 
1995-1999 Average 4.0* -9.0* -5.0* -19.00 65.06 
2000-2004 Average -3.0* -45.0 32.0** 43.0** 64.96 
2005-2009 Average -7.0 -11.0 38.0** 32.0** 63.44 
2010-2016 Average 50.0** -76.0 -3.0** -88.0 58.74 
2010 27.0** -51.0 15.0** -60.0 63.77 
2011 21.0* -28.0 25.0** -43.0 62.01 
2012 -116.0 46.0** 50.0** 112.0*** 59.07 
2013 -11.00 47.00** 31.00** 37.00** 57.91 
2014 2.00* -1.00 25.00** 23.00** 55.63 
2015 -16.00 -48.00 5.00* -41.00 55.63 
2016 4.00* -9.00 -5.00 -19.00 57.14 
Legend: *** = significant at 0.01 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; * = significant at 0.10 level; 
ANNIpCG = Adjusted Net National Income per Capita Annual Growth Rate. 
 
In the South European EU member countries, it have been the healthcare and the welfare indicators that 
had an important effect on HDI. However, as in the advanced EU member countries, net national 
income per capita had also a very strong impact on these countries’ social and economic development. 
The above results pose an intriguing and important question: while the growth rate of the per capita net 
national income did not have a large impact on the countries’ HDI, especially before the recent 
worldwide crisis, the change of this indicator frequently had a negative impact on HDI. We may even 
conclude from this finding that it is not the level of per capita national income—or per capita 
GDP—that results in the improvement of education, healthcare and welfare services, but the latter 
factors drive the countries’ economic development (Note 19). As was mentioned before, the World 
Bank also published its Human Capital Index (HCI) in 2018. Comparing it to my HCap for 2016, we 
can see that the World Bank’s HCI and my HCap rank the post-socialist and the CEE populist countries 
at the same place. 
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Table 6. The World Bank’s Human Capital Index for 2017 and HCap2016 by Country Groups 
HCI and HCap Indicators WDI 2017 HCap 2016 
Post-Socialist Countries 61.86 45.98 
CEE Populist Countries 72.97 49.65 
Advanced Countries 80.41 48.32 
EU Advanced Countries 77.88 62.24 
EU Southern Countries 74.23 39.64 
Source: WDI 2018 and my calculations based on WDI’s data. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Why and how would these adverse developments in Central and Eastern Europe—and unfortunately in 
some West European and South European countries, too—result in the destabilization of the European 
Union? Several Central and East European countries have been admitted to the European Union since 
2004 with the expectation that this would lead to the enlargement of European markets and integrate 
these countries into a democratic Western Europe. As it is shown by comparative analyses, expectations 
about Europe’s improving competitiveness and economic efficiency have not been realized in the past 
25 years of Central and Eastern Europe’s economic and political transition. These countries are much 
busier grabbing as much as they can of EU support funds than creating solid and efficient markets and 
legal institutions that could foster their economic development. Most of the acquired funds are then 
allocated by the ruling political parties and their government bureaucracy to their loyal supporters. 
Populism and paternalism has been accompanied by rapidly increasing corruption in many of these 
countries. While Baltic countries ranked fairly well in Transparency International’s “Corruption 
Perception Index, 2017”, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Russia, along with other former 
member states of the Soviet Union, are found among the more or most corrupt and least developed 
countries of the world (Note 20). I must add that the decision-making bodies of the EU have not been 
innocent in the evolution of this negative trend either; they closed their eyes to avoid having to confront 
severe political corruption in several Central and East European countries. 
Building and authoritarian regime, paternalism and corruption constitute what a group of Hungarian 
social scientists coined as “the Mafia state” (Note 21). Hungary, with its current ruling parties and 
government is a textbook example of the Mafia state. The Hungarian government speaks and acts like a 
“pater familias” while it tries to control the whole judiciary, the media, services and 
infrastructure—including the banking sector, gas, water and electricity supply—and it uses the police to 
suppress its opponents (Note 22). Regrettably, similar developments are taking place in other CEE 
countries, too. It is a small wonder that Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister considers Vladimir 
Putin as one of his best friends. It is not fully clear yet what happened before and during the last 
presidential elections in the US but the “business relationship” of president Trump’s family members 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf         Journal of Economics and Public Finance                     Vol. 5, No. 2, 2019 
251 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
and his closest staff members with president Putin and his closest allies reveals uncanny similarities to 
developments in Hungary as well. 
One could challenge my interpretation of the gathering tensions within the EU arguing that the adverse 
political developments mentioned above are nothing but the transitory symptoms of the immigration 
crisis sweeping across Europe. It is true that Europe as a whole, and the European Union in particular 
have been overwhelmed by millions of Muslim immigrants and the threat of successive terrorist attacks, 
like the ones in Paris and recently in Brussels and Barcelona. EU organizations and the leaders of some 
member states also made several mistakes in addressing the immigration crisis. Instead of looking for a 
coordinated strategy, they played the “prisoners’ dilemma game”. In other words, most of them tried to 
shift the burden of hosting immigrants onto all the other countries. Ultimately, each country found itself 
worse off than if they had cooperated. 
The constitution of the EU and its voting rules—requiring unanimity on fundamental issues—hands 
Central and East European member states the means to undermine the common strategy and policy of 
the European Union. As a matter of fact, a large number of EU politicians have come to regard Mr. 
Orbán as an efficient and shrewd leader showing the way out of the crisis, which is startling and a huge 
mistake on their part. In reality, Mr. Orbán simply uses arguments against accepting immigrants to 
advance his own domestic political agenda. While Hungary is hosting about 1,400 immigrants from the 
Middle East, Mr. Orbán and his fellow party leaders planned to declare a state of emergency, they 
enacted a new law that allows police surveillance of telephone calls and e-mails, and they try to present 
all immigrants as dangerous monsters. Their efforts and actions have been supported even by the 
former British prime minister who hoped to rely on extremists in Hungary and other East European 
countries to justify Brexit. 
The policies the EU is trying to implement right now would have offered a sensible solution of the 
immigration crisis from the very start. Namely, financing and creating shelter for immigrants in Muslim 
countries like Turkey and other Middle Eastern nations. Hopefully, these policies will provide Europe 
with a way-out from the current crisis, even if they will not resolve the main underlying issues. Notably, 
how can the leading Western countries—like Germany, Great Britain, France, etc.—shepherd Central 
and Eastern Europe in the right direction: back to solid and liberal political democracies and 
market-based economies? Should the strongest EU member states fail in their effort, they will face a 
Europe besieged by nationalist and ethnic conflicts, unpredictable political regimes and a disintegrating 
economic and political union. 
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Notes 
Note 1. On populism in the US see Rodrik, D. (2018). In Europe see Ash, T. G. (2018), Cohen, R. 
(2018), around the world see Galston, W. A. (2019). 
Note 2. See Berend, T. I. (2017, 2018) and Kornai, J. (2006). 
Note 3. Albright, M. (2018); Cohen, R. (2018); Krugman, P. (2016, 2018); Rodrik, D. (2018) and 
Wilson, A. (2013). 
Note 4. I published a paper about the Greek financial crisis based on the theory of “the tragedy of the 
anti-commons” in 2014 (See Major, 2014). This approach can easily be translated to the migration 
crisis in Europe, too. 
Note 5. See, e.g., Obláth (2016). 
Note 6. This is especially valid for Hungary. 
Note 7. Advanced EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden. 
Note 8. South European EU member countries: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Note 9. This is especially valid for Hungary. 
Note 10. The high rate of FDI inflow between 2010 and 2017 comes mostly from FDI in China and in 
the post-Soviet countries, first of all, in Russia. 
Note 11. Calculations of the subsequent indicators are based on the WDI 2018 data. 
Note 12. he original HDI index is the simple average of three separate indices: 
Literacy Rate Index = 
rateliteracy  Minimum - rateliteracy  Maximum
countries all of rateliteracy  minimum - rateliteracy  scountry' The
; 
Health Indicator = 
rate expectancy life Minimum - rate expectancy life Maximum
countries all of rate expectancy life minimum  the- rate expectancy life scountry' The
; 
Economic Welfare = 
   
   capitaper  GNP log Minimum - capitaper  GNP log Maximum
countries all ofcapitaper  GNP log minimum  the- capitaper  GNP log scountry' The
, 
where the logarithmic value reflects the diminishing return of people’s income. 
Note 13. See UNO Human Development Report (2018). 
Note 14. The World Bank started publishing their Human Capital Index (HCI) in 2018, too. I shall 
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present and contrast the World Bank’ HCI with my HCap in this paper below. 
Note 15. See Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). 
Note 16. On this issue see Grossman and Helpman (2018). 
Note 17. Our book on different healthcare systems in the world, and especially on the collapse of 
Hungarian healthcare have been recently published, see Major and Ozsvald (2018). 
Note 18. OECD (2017). 
Note 19. This finding is compatible with the conclusions of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), Deaton 
(2010, 2013), North (2012) and several other authors about economic development. 
Note 20. See the table of Corruption Perceptions Indices in the Annex. As can be seen in the table, most 
of the Central and East European countries—I highlighted them—are lagging far behind the advanced 
European, North American and Asian countries with regard to corruption. Only several Middle Eastern 
and Sub-Saharan African have a lower rank than the post-socialist countries, with a few exceptions 
among them. 
Note 21. In M. Bálint, & V. Júlia (Eds.), 2017. 
Note 22. See Major (2017) in M. Bálint, & V. Júlia (Eds.), 2017. 
 
Appendix 
Table A.1. Corruption Perceptions Index, 2012-2017 
Country CPI 2017 CPI 2016 CPI 2015 CPI 2014 CPI 2013 CPI 2012 
Denmark 78.1 74.6 75.6 74.7 74.0 75.0 
New Zealand 89.0 90.0 91.0 91.0 91.0 90.0 
Finland 85.0 89.0 90.0 89.0 89.0 90.0 
Sweden 84.0 88.0 89.0 87.0 89.0 88.0 
Switzerland 85.0 86.0 86.0 86.0 85.0 86.0 
Norway 85.0 85.0 88.0 86.0 86.0 85.0 
Netherlands 82.0 83.0 84.0 83.0 83.0 84.0 
France 82.0 69.0 70.0 69.0 71.0 71.0 
Germany 81.0 81.0 81.0 79.0 78.0 79.0 
Ireland 82.0 73.0 75.0 74.0 72.0 69.0 
Luxembourg 75.0 81.0 85.0 82.0 80.0 80.0 
United Kingdom 77.0 81.0 81.0 78.0 76.0 74.0 
Iceland 75.0 78.0 79.0 79.0 78.0 82.0 
Belgium 74.0 77.0 77.0 76.0 75.0 75.0 
Austria 70.0 75.0 76.0 72.0 69.0 69.0 
EU Adv. Co.s Mean 80.9 81.7 82.9 81.5 80.9 80.8 
Australia 77.0 79.0 79.0 80.0 81.0 85.0 
Canada 81.0 82.0 83.0 81.0 81.0 84.0 
Germany 82.0 81.0 81.0 79.0 78.0 79.0 
Japan 73.0 72.0 75.0 76.0 74.0 74.0 
United States 82.0 74.0 76.0 74.0 73.0 73.0 
United Kingdom 77.0 81.0 81.0 78.0 76.0 74.0 
Korea (South) 75.0 53.0 54.0 55.0 55.0 56.0 
Adv. Co.s Mean 78.1 74.6 75.6 74.7 74.0 75.0 
Estonia 71.0 70.0 70.0 69.0 68.0 64.0 
Lithuania 59.0 59.0 59.0 58.0 57.0 54.0 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf         Journal of Economics and Public Finance                     Vol. 5, No. 2, 2019 
255 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Latvia 58.0 57.0 56.0 55.0 53.0 49.0 
Baltic Co.s Mean 62.7 62.0 61.7 60.7 59.3 55.7 
Poland 60.0 62.0 63.0 61.0 60.0 58.0 
Slovenia 61.0 61.0 60.0 58.0 57.0 61.0 
Czech Republic 57.0 55.0 56.0 51.0 48.0 49.0 
Slovakia 50.0 51.0 51.0 50.0 47.0 46.0 
Croatia 49.0 49.0 51.0 48.0 48.0 46.0 
Hungary 45.0 48.0 51.0 54.0 54.0 55.0 
CEE Co.s Mean 53.7 54.3 55.3 53.7 52.3 52.5 
Poland 60.0 62.0 63.0 61.0 60.0 58.0 
Czech Republic 57.0 55.0 56.0 51.0 48.0 49.0 
Slovakia 50.0 51.0 51.0 50.0 47.0 46.0 
Croatia 49.0 49.0 51.0 48.0 48.0 46.0 
Hungary 45.0 48.0 51.0 54.0 54.0 55.0 
Russia 29.0 29.0 29.0 27.0 28.0 28.0 
CEE Populists Mean 48.3 49.0 50.2 48.5 47.5 47.0 
Portugal 63.0 62.0 64.0 63.0 62.0 63.0 
Cyprus 57.0 55.0 61.0 63.0 63.0 66.0 
Spain 57.0           
Italy 50.0 47.0 44.0 43.0 43.0 42.0 
Greece 48.0 44.0 46.0 43.0 40.0 36.0 
Turkey 40.0 41.0 42.0 45.0 50.0 49.0 
South EU Co. s Mean 52.6 49.8 51.4 51.4 51.6 51.2 
Romania 48.0 48.0 46.0 43.0 43.0 44.0 
Moldova 31.0 30.0 33.0 35.0 35.0 36.0 
Bulgaria 41.0 41.0 41.0 43.0 41.0 41.0 
Albania 38.0 39.0 36.0 33.0 31.0 33.0 
Serbia 43.0 42.0 40.0 41.0 42.0 39.0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 39.0 39.0 38.0 39.0 42.0 42.0 
The FYR of Macedonia 35.0 37.0 42.0 45.0 44.0 43.0 
Kosovo 38.0 36.0 33.0 33.0 33.0 34.0 
Balkan Mean 39.1 37.7 37.6 38.4 38.3 38.3 
Belarus 56.0 40.0 32.0 31.0 29.0 31.0 
Mongolia 44.0 38.0 39.0 39.0 38.0 36.0 
Georgia 36.0 57.0 52.0 52.0 49.0 52.0 
Armenia 35.0 33.0 35.0 37.0 36.0 34.0 
Azerbaijan 30.0 30.0 29.0 29.0 28.0 27.0 
Kazakhstan 31.0 29.0 28.0 29.0 26.0 28.0 
Russia 29.0 29.0 29.0 27.0 28.0 28.0 
Ukraine 29.0 29.0 27.0 26.0 25.0 26.0 
Kyrgyzstan 31.0 28.0 28.0 27.0 24.0 24.0 
Tajikistan 21.0 25.0 26.0 23.0 22.0 22.0 
Turkmenistan 22.0 22.0 18.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 
Uzbekistan 19.0 21.0 19.0 18.0 17.0 17.0 
Post-Soviet Co.s Mean 29.7 31.8 30.2 29.6 28.3 28.5 
Korea (North) 41.0 12.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Vietnam 35.0 33.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 
China 29.0 40.0 37.0 36.0 40.0 39.0 
Laos 30.0 28.0 22.0 21.0 21.0 15.0 
Cambodia 17.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 20.0 22.0 
Asian Post-soc. Mean 30.4 26.8 23.8 23.4 24.0 23.0 
Cuba 47.0 47.0 47.0 46.0 46.0 48.0 
Nicaragua 26.0 26 26 27 28 29 
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LA Post-soc. Mean 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 37.0 38.5 
 
Rank 2000 Country CPI 2000 CPI 1995 Country Rank 1995 
1 Finland 100.0 95.5 New Zealand 1 
2 Denmark 98.0 93.2 Denmark 2 
3 New Zealand 94.0 88.7 Sweden 3 
3 Sweden 94.0 91.2 Finland 4 
6 Iceland 91.0 86.1 Norway 6 
6 Norway 91.0 87.6 Switzerland 8 
6 Netherlands 89.0 86.9 Netherlands 9 
9 United Kingdom 87.0 85.7 Ireland 11 
14 Austria 77.0 85.7 United Kingdom 12 
10 Luxembourg 86.0 81.4 Germany 13 
15 Germany 76.0 71.3 Austria 16 
11 Switzerland 86.0 70.0 France 19 
18 Ireland 72.0 68.5 Belgium 20 
20 France 67.0 n.a. Luxembourg n.a. 
23 Belgium 61.0 n.a. Iceland n.a. 
EU Advanced Co.s Mean 85.1 84.0    
11 Australia 83.0 88.7 Canada 5 
13 USA 78.0 88.0 Australia 10 
5 Canada 92.0 85.7 United Kingdom 12 
9 United Kingdom 87.0 81.4 Germany 13 
15 Germany 76.0 77.9 U.S.A. 15 
22 Japan 64.0 67.2 Japan 17 
43 South Korea 40.0 42.9 South Korea 26 
Advanced Countries Mean 74.3 76.0    
26 Estonia 57.0 n.a. Estonia n.a. 
43 Lithuania 41.0 n.a. Lithuania n.a. 
51 Latvia 34.0 n.a. Latvia n.a. 
Baltic Countries Mean 44.0 n.a. 
 
 
27 Slovenia 55.0 55.7 Poland 24 
30 Hungary 52.0 53.7 Czech Rep. 25 
41 Czech Republic 43.0 41.2 Hungary 31 
43 Poland 41.0 n.a. Croatia n.a. 
50 Croatia 37.0 n.a. Slovenia n.a. 
51 Slovak Republic 35.0 n.a. Slovak Republic n.a. 
  Mean 43.8 50.2 Mean   
30 Hungary 52.0 55.7 Poland 24 
41 Czech Republic 43.0 53.7 Czech Rep. 25 
43 Poland 41.0 41.2 Hungary 31 
50 Croatia 37.0 n.a. Croatia n.a. 
51 Slovak Republic 35.0 n.a. Russia n.a. 
82 Russia 21.0 n.a. Slovak Republic n.a. 
  Mean 38.2 50.2 Mean   
19 Spain 70.0 55.6 Portugal 22 
23 Portugal 64.0 40.4 Greece 28 
  Cyprus n.a. 43.5 Spain 32 
34 Greece 49.0 41.0 Turkey 33 
37 Italy 46.0 29.9 Italy 34 
49 Turkey 38.0 n.a. Cyprus n.a. 
Southern EU Co.s Mean 53.4 42.1 
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51 Bulgaria 35.0 n.a. Bulgaria n.a. 
65 Romania 29.0 n.a. Romania n.a. 
74 Moldova 26.0 n.a. Moldova n.a. 
 n.a. Albania n.a. n.a. Albania n.a. 
87 Yugoslavia 13.0 n.a. Yugoslavia n.a. 
87 Yugoslavia 13.0 n.a. Yugoslavia n.a. 
87 Yugoslavia 13.0 n.a. Yugoslavia n.a. 
87 Yugoslavia 13.0 n.a. Yugoslavia n.a. 
Balkan Countries Mean 25.8 n.a. 
 
  
42 Belarus 41.0 n.a. Belarus n.a. 
65 Kazakhstan 30.0 n.a. Kazakhstan n.a. 
74 Armenia 25.0 n.a. Armenia n.a. 
76 Uzbekistan 24.0 n.a. Uzbekistan n.a. 
82 Russia 21.0 n.a. Russia n.a. 
85 Azerbaijan 15.0 n.a. Azerbaijan n.a. 
87 Ukraine 15.0 n.a. Ukraine n.a. 
n.a. Kyrgyzstan n.a. n.a. Kyrgyzstan n.a. 
 
n.a. Tajikistan n.a. n.a. Tajikistan n.a. 
n.a. Turkmenistan n.a. n.a. Turkmenistan n.a. 
n.a. Uzbekistan n.a. n.a. Uzbekistan n.a. 
n.a. Mongolia n.a. n.a. Mongolia n.a. 
Post-Soviet Countries Mean 24.4 n.a. 
 
  
63 China 31.0 21.6 China 50 
76 Vietnam 25.0 n.a. Vietnam n.a. 
n.a. Korea (North) n.a. n.a. Korea (North) n.a. 
n.a. Laos n.a. n.a. Laos n.a. 
n.a. Cambodia n.a. n.a. Cambodia n.a. 
Asian Post-soc. Co.s Mean 28.0 21.6 
 
  
n.a. Cuba n.a. n.a. Cuba n.a. 
n.a. Nicaragua n.a. n.a. Nicaragua n.a. 
LA Post-soc. Co.s Mean n.a. n.a. 
 
  
Source: Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International, January 2017. Retrieved from 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table  
 
Groups CPI 2017 CPI 2016 CPI 2015 CPI 2014 CPI 2013 CPI 2012 CPI 2000 CPI 1995 
EU Adv. Mean 80.9 81.7 82.9 81.5 80.9 80.8 85.1 84.0 
Advanced Mean 78.1 74.6 75.6 74.7 74.0 75.0 74.3 76.0 
EU South Mean 52.6 49.8 51.4 51.4 51.6 51.2 53.4 42.1 
Baltic Mean 62.7 62.0 61.7 60.7 59.3 55.7 44.0 n.a. 
CEE Mean 53.7 54.3 55.3 53.7 52.3 52.5 43.8 50.2 
Populist Mean 48.3 49.0 50.2 48.5 47.5 47.0 38.2 48.2 
Balkan Mean 39.1 37.7 37.6 38.4 38.3 38.3 25.8 n.a. 
Post-Soviet Mean 29.7 31.8 30.2 29.6 28.3 28.5 24.4 n.a. 
Asian Mean 30.4 26.8 23.8 23.4 24.0 23.0 28.0 21.6 
LA Mean 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 37.0 38.5 n.a. n.a. 
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Table A.2. Human Capital Index by Country Groups between 1990 and 2016 
 
Avg 
90-94 
Avg 
95-99 
Avg 
00-04 
Avg 
05-09 
Avg 
10-16 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
HCap Balkan 39.36 42.92 39.46 38.57 38.73 38.52 40.32 39.84 41.08 37.47 38.54 38.40 
HCap Baltic 61.29 65.28 66.34 57.33 58.93 56.78 57.66 61.43 62.43 57.30 57.12 57.38 
HCap Post-Soviet 46.52 52.10 51.13 51.44 51.78 47.85 47.22 49.45 54.26 48.77 50.48 50.16 
HCap CEE 48.87 53.09 55.43 47.75 55.02 54.38 54.32 57.14 57.53 54.55 54.94 54.32 
HCap Asian 27.22 31.95 37.39 35.05 31.84 28.82 28.38 32.80 38.53 34.27 32.12 31.74 
HCap LA 44.51 47.08 50.48 44.07 44.86 44.53 43.11 46.44 47.67 44.25 44.22 43.87 
Hcap Post-socialist 44.63 48.73 50.04 45.70 46.86 45.15 45.17 47.85 50.25 46.10 46.24 45.98 
HCap Populist 46.28 50.09 51.62 41.15 50.66 49.95 49.59 52.38 53.59 50.23 50.63 49.65 
HCap Advanced 55.82 58.76 56.29 50.69 49.83 51.34 49.63 50.70 53.24 48.29 48.25 48.32 
HCap Euro Area 62.88 66.00 62.28 54.98 53.27 55.89 53.69 53.80 57.96 52.47 52.20 52.59 
HCap EU 64.01 65.00 61.48 54.83 52.33 54.91 52.44 50.99 57.25 51.93 51.97 52.62 
HCap EU Advanced 67.25 73.90 68.41 63.96 61.98 63.27 61.82 61.58 65.55 61.91 61.88 62.24 
HCap EU South 37.08 42.24 39.42 36.99 38.59 38.63 37.70 37.83 43.11 39.09 39.56 39.64 
HCap U.S.A. 69.72 73.05 82.69 70.43 66.81 67.77 66.22 67.38 67.64 66.55 64.93 65.01 
 
Table A.3. Healthcare Index by Country Groups between 1990 and 2016 
 
Avg 
90-94 
Avg 
95-99 
Avg 
00-04 
Avg 
05-09 
Avg 
10-16 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Healthcare Balkan 74.37 71.58 69.43 66.20 62.08 64.56 64.69 66.02 63.89 61.82 60.36 61.28 
Healthcare Baltic 73.62 68.28 63.94 63.64 60.38 62.92 63.07 63.56 62.52 60.67 59.23 60.17 
Healthcare Post-Soviet 66.02 60.53 56.43 55.08 51.39 54.23 53.84 54.46 53.56 52.16 51.08 51.39 
Healthcare CEE 74.78 71.91 69.62 68.93 65.15 68.05 67.76 68.93 67.13 64.68 62.70 63.99 
Healthcare Asian 63.08 57.07 51.43 53.01 51.98 53.26 53.66 55.37 54.69 53.65 52.71 52.67 
Healthcare LA 61.54 60.56 60.19 66.12 63.94 65.24 65.58 63.25 64.73 66.48 67.34 66.84 
Healthcare Post-socialist 68.90 64.99 61.84 62.16 59.15 61.38 61.43 61.93 61.09 59.91 58.90 59.39 
Healthcare Populist 74.14 70.86 68.23 67.83 64.05 66.98 66.62 67.61 66.22 63.64 61.68 62.87 
Healthcare Advanced 80.09 80.88 81.36 80.85 78.58 80.88 81.05 82.49 81.05 77.22 74.37 76.43 
Healthcare Euro Area 82.47 81.12 84.92 91.44 91.58 92.48 93.38 95.28 94.02 90.47 87.11 90.17 
Healthcare EU 79.77 79.59 83.63 88.30 88.79 89.37 90.46 92.41 91.39 87.91 84.65 87.75 
Healthcare EU Advanced 89.99 90.81 91.09 91.17 91.66 91.66 93.08 95.87 94.49 90.76 87.46 90.27 
Healthcare EU South 83.77 84.89 86.25 87.53 85.92 88.84 88.93 89.67 87.81 84.73 82.72 85.29 
Healthcare U.S.A. 85.54 89.04 90.09 89.03 89.68 89.35 89.76 92.88 91.08 85.53 81.72 86.43 
 
Table A.4. Welfare Index by Country Groups between 1990 and 2016 
 
Avg 
90-94 
Avg 
95-99 
Avg 
00-04 
Avg 
05-09 
Avg 
10-16 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Welfare Balkan 37.74 38.82 33.63 34.33 36.19 42.41 41.88 44.00 42.69 42.28 44.87 42.24 
Welfare Baltic 49.34 47.17 38.44 40.31 41.61 46.54 46.99 48.35 45.85 47.08 48.42 46.12 
Welfare Post-Soviet 44.30 45.25 44.79 46.58 49.11 54.67 53.96 55.66 53.92 51.63 52.83 49.39 
Welfare CEE 53.96 54.74 47.41 49.71 47.40 53.41 51.77 54.23 52.86 52.20 55.51 51.78 
Welfare Asian 41.50 43.90 36.96 36.63 40.75 50.00 44.79 47.66 45.65 40.77 41.61 42.15 
Welfare LA 34.83 34.87 33.54 35.25 35.47 39.75 37.94 39.51 39.08 37.19 35.82 39.53 
Welfare Post-socialist 43.61 44.13 39.13 40.47 41.76 47.80 46.22 48.23 46.67 45.19 46.51 45.20 
Welfare Populist 54.19 54.18 46.46 48.91 46.66 52.23 50.88 53.18 51.44 50.53 53.63 49.76 
Welfare Advanced 45.10 48.39 40.26 43.02 46.48 56.51 56.19 58.25 54.65 52.36 55.04 51.97 
Welfare Euro Area 76.05 83.92 77.16 75.52 75.17 77.20 73.40 72.63 68.79 65.40 64.56 68.62 
Welfare EU 58.75 61.38 58.33 53.46 38.97 51.88 46.63 35.37 28.16 25.88 27.40 34.36 
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Welfare EU Advanced 76.05 83.92 77.16 75.52 75.17 77.20 73.40 72.63 68.79 65.40 64.56 68.62 
Welfare EU Southern 58.75 61.38 58.33 53.46 38.97 51.88 46.63 35.37 28.16 25.88 27.40 34.36 
Welfare U.S.A. 68.02 63.66 63.65 65.04 59.72 58.16 59.75 61.53 62.61 62.15 53.83 55.05 
 
Table A.5. Adjusted Net National Income per Capita (logarithm) Index by Country Groups 
between 1990 and 2016 
GINI+CPI 
Adjusted 
Avg 
90-94 
Avg 
95-99 
Avg 
00-04 
Avg 
05-09 
Avg 
10-16 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Balkan Co.s 24.75 21.17 18.68 27.94 34.65 36.23 36.80 34.94 34.33 35.37 35.58 28.96 
Baltic Co.s 43.04 44.22 46.99 57.58 62.79 58.04 60.95 61.94 63.12 64.41 64.98 61.68 
Post-Soviet Co.s 9.88 5.35 6.09 17.43 24.22 24.00 25.20 23.80 22.62 24.40 23.98 15.07 
CEE 60.95 56.62 53.38 60.34 64.00 64.60 64.83 63.63 62.70 63.89 64.74 60.12 
Asian Co.s 16.56 13.54 11.68 17.52 19.65 20.36 18.01 18.12 19.04 20.39 20.00 13.92 
LA Co.s 19.84 15.44 12.95 20.65 23.69 25.04 21.55 21.48 22.62 24.66 24.13 15.41 
Populist 59.77 53.04 47.49 55.26 59.79 59.60 60.25 59.48 58.88 59.83 60.90 55.52 
Advanced 92.43 90.81 89.76 90.39 92.98 93.06 93.23 93.23 92.82 92.85 92.77 91.73 
Euro Area 86.37 86.69 87.53 87.23 87.30 87.78 87.89 87.36 86.90 87.01 87.09 85.52 
EU 82.86 81.80 81.13 82.15 83.40 83.55 83.74 83.22 82.81 83.22 83.64 81.52 
EU Advanced Co.s 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
EU Southern Co.s 68.52 71.73 75.85 75.77 73.53 75.74 74.77 73.42 72.56 72.81 72.82 69.26 
U.S.A. 46.75 52.10 46.45 44.67 43.21 43.39 43.37 42.68 43.07 42.92 43.70 42.40 
 
 
Figure 1. Difference between the CEE Populists and Post-Socialist Countries’ HDI, 1990-2016 
 
 
Figure 2. Difference between the Advanced Countries and the CEE Populists’ HDI, 1990-2016 
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Figure 3. Difference between the EU’s Advanced Countries’ and the CEE Populists’ HDI, 
1990-2016 
 
 
Figure 4. The EU’s Southern Countries’ and the CEE Populists’ HDI, 1990-2016 
 
 
Figure 5. The Baltic Countries’ and the CEE Populists’ HDI, 1990-2016 
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